[sbe-eas] Subject: Re: PEP Stations

[sbe-eas at fetrow.org]

While I pretty much agree with everything you write, you missed one  
big -- actually HUGE -- issue.

Who in the public, our customers, have EAS receivers?  The answer is,  
NONE!

Until there is an EAS receiver in nearly every home, we are just  
spinning our wheels.

On Feb 10, 2012, at 10:00 AM, sbe-eas-request at sbe.org wrote:


> Message: 1

> Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2012 03:23:42 -0500 (EST)

> From: Sean Donelan <sean at donelan.com>

> Subject: Re: [sbe-eas] Subject: Re:  PEP Stations

>

> On Sun, 5 Feb 2012, Frank Lucia wrote:

>> Some thoughts on possible EAS problems

>>

>> 1. power outages - large and small

>> 2. generator failures

>> 3. EAS equipment failures

>> 4. emergency management connectivity especially overnight

>> etc.

>

> It depends on what and when people think EAS' role should be.  If  

> EAS is

> only for "alerting" before predictable events, then you don't need to

> worry about many of the things that stop working after a disaster.  If

> EAS still includes the role of that EBS had before, during and after a

> disaster, then you need to worry about gaining attention before an

> event, the impact during the event on the communication systems  

> itself,

> and speedy post-event recovery of the communication systems.

>

> My assumption is the name change was about the expansion from just

> broadcasters (EBS) to include cable and other systems (EAS).  The

> name change was not intended reflect a policy change of limiting the

> use of the system only for alerts in advance of predictable dangerous

> events.

>

> Before an event:

>   Training emergency officials how to activate the alert system

>   Public attention is very fragmented before an event, and often

>     not paying attention to any communication channel

>   Automated facilities, manual processes don't work

>   Staffed facilities, automated processes disrupt their work

>   Closed circuit channels are needed within the system to maintain

>     confidence of the operators (when errors happen, when messages  

> aren't

>     clear, when fixing problems, etc)

>   Only some types of disaster events are predictable

>

> During an event:

>   Alert speed is important for unexpected disaster events

>   Public needs to be able quickly recogonize a "real" alert message,

>     confirm it and act on it

>   Systems which aren't normally used, often fail at the time of a  

> crisis

>   Operator error should be expected (originator, aggregator,  

> distributor,

>     receiver, etc)

>   Power failures are common in all types of disasters

>   Communication channel failures are common in all types of disasters

>   Diversity, not just redundancy, is needed

>

> After an event (or a disaster becomes multiple disasters)

>   An event affecting someone else is a news story, an event affecting

>      the broadcaster/cable/satellite/etc itself is a crisis

>   How many communications channels are needed after a disaster?  Does

>      everything need to work, or just a few minimum essential  

> facilities?

>   15 minutes, 8 hours, 72 hours, 30 days, 90 days how long before  

> outside

>      help should be expected

>   Mutual aid and pre-planned sharing of resources including  

> programming

>     sources (i.e. use of EBS/EAS granted automatic re-transmission  

> rights)

>   Distributing and integrating post-event official emergency  

> information

>     into multiple communication channels (some wall-to-wall, some  

> still

>     on automation, interactive channels, internet, paper, etc)

>   Not all emergency information needs to go direct to air. After an  

> event,

>     even when traditional communication channels may not be working,

>     government public information officers still want to get the

>     information to reporters wherever they are, continuously, not at  

> just

>     the traditional once a day news conference.

>

> All the time:

>    Nobody has extra money to spend for stuff.